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Abstract 
 
This paper develops a model of economic growth and activity locating endogenously on a 3-
dimensional featureless global geography.  The same economic forces influence 
simultaneously growth, convergence, and spatial agglomeration and clustering. Economic 
activity is not concentrated on discrete isolated points but instead a dynamically-fluctuating, 
smooth spatial distribution.  Spatial inequality is a Cass-Koopmans saddlepath, and the global 
distribution of economic activity converges towards egalitarian growth. Equality is stable but 
spatial inequality is needed to attain it. 
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Spatial agglomeration dynamics
by
Danny Quah ∗
LSE Department of Economics
Income inequality across geography is as profound as it is across peo-
ple. In spatial inequality, agglomeration and clustering constitute the
observations to be formalized and explained. Understanding their evo-
lution draws on ideas in economic development, growth, and economic
geography.
When spatial inequality analyses are motivated by contrasting, say,
New York City and Yuma, Arizona the set of economic forces a re-
searcher identiﬁes distinguishes prototypes of the two locations one has
in mind. New York might have economic activity showing high increas-
ing returns; Yuma, by contrast, might produce goods with signiﬁcant
transport costs. The reasoning—canonical in economic geography—
then addresses why New York enjoys an income level higher than
Yuma’s, i.e., it explains income inequality.
That analysis is silent, however, on a number of interesting ques-
tions. Why are the clusters potentially only in Yuma and New York,
not anywhere in between or beyond? How many clusters should endoge-
nously emerge—if N locations are a priori possible, does Yuma/New
York reasoning predict N/2 high-income agglomerations, or just 1? If
N/2, are they interspersed in between low-income points, or do they
collect all together at one end of the physical geography? (And what
if N isn’t given?) Does it matter that from Yuma, New York is 2100
miles northeast, or would the same reasoning work for comparing with
San Francisco—how do spatial relations matter? Put diﬀerently, where
is geography in this model of economic geography?
This paper describes research in spatial dynamics that address these
and related questions (Paul Krugman and Anthony Venables (1997),
Danny Quah (2000, 2001)).1 I illustrate the ideas in a dynamic perfect-
foresight equilibrium model that integrates growth, geography, and dis-
tribution in an explicit geographical space, namely a 3-dimensional
∗ I thank the ESRC (award R022250126) and the Andrew Mellon
Foundation for supporting parts of the research reported here.
1 The mathematical tools here might appear unfamiliar but are
ﬁrmly classical: their core goes back at least to Ulf Grenander and
Gabor Szego¨ (1958) and Alan Turing (1952).
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globe. The model determines the number of spatial modes (agglomera-
tions, clusters) in economic activity on this globe, the locations of these
agglomerations relative to one another, and their dynamics along con-
vergent paths to balanced growth steady state. (Multiple spatial modes
can imply the kind of twin-peaked income distributions described in
Quah (1997).)
The model is neoclassical with the driver of economic growth being
technology, or knowledge accumulation.2 In the model, new knowl-
edge is generated exogenously. Transportation costs are zero so that
knowledge potentially disseminates freely across space. However, in
any given location and at any given time, the eﬀective use of knowl-
edge depends on past choices made there on the use of knowledge, and
on current and past choices made in surrounding locations. The model
displays imperfect productivity spillovers across space and time, and
determines spatial and dynamic ﬂuctuations jointly.
Uniformity—an egalitarian spatial income distribution—is always
an equilibrium, and characterizes balanced-growth steady state. How-
ever, spatial agglomerations or clusters appear in perfect foresight Cass-
Koopmans saddlepath transitions: such inequality dynamics are nec-
essary for convergence to balanced-growth steady state.
Close in spirit to this paper—despite the diﬀerences in model, meth-
ods, and conclusions—Eeckhout and Jovanovic (2001) study knowledge
spillovers in production where permanent inequality resolves a tension
between catching up and free riding. In Dilip Mookherjee and Debraj
Ray (2002), equality is unstable. Here, equality is stable, but spatial
inequality is needed to achieve it. Kiminori Matsuyama (2002) studies
the stability and general structure of discrete equilibria in complemen-
tarity games, in a way related to the concerns expressed above on the
unsatisfactory nature of two-point (or, more generally, discrete) equi-
librium outcomes.
1 The Model
Let z denote a representative location on a geography G, and normalize∫
G
dz to 1. (Section 2.2 below specializes G to the surface of a 3-
dimensional globe, but the discussion until then is general. If it helps
2 James Feyrer (2001) shows it is TFP, rather than capital or la-
bor, that accounts for the twinpeakedness of the cross-country income
distribution given in Quah (1997).
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intuition, the reader can, without loss, visualize what happens between
now and then using that special case.)
The technology level in use at time t in location z is At(z) ≥ 0.
Write the spatial proﬁle or distribution as At = {At(z) | z ∈ G}. In
this model, technology and (accumulated) knowledge are synonymous,
so that the average state of knowledge worldwide is At =
∫
G
At(z) dz.
Uniformity has At = At(z) ∀z. Spatial agglomerations or clusters are
modes in the spatial distribution At, inducing in turn modes in the
spatial distribution of incomes (5) below.
As much A as demanded is supplied: Think of this as D in R&D,
where R perpetually runs ahead of D (i.e., R grows by rate at least g
given in (8) below), and is ﬁnanced by nondistortionary taxation with
output made costlessly available to everyone.
Each location is its own inﬁnitesimally-small nation. It discounts
the future at constant rate ρ > 0 and produces gross output
F (At(z) | At) =Wz(At)×At(z) (1)
with
Wz(At) =
∫
G
K(z, z′)At(z′) dz′ (2)
where for all z the weighting function K(z, ·) is a probability den-
sity or probability kernel on G, so that K(z, z′) ≥ 0 for all z′ and∫
G
K(z, z′) dz′ = 1. By (1)–(2) output is linear in the state of knowl-
edge At(z), with coeﬃcient (marginal product) equal to a weighted
average of the current levels of A in the appropriate neighborhood of
z.
Weighting function K is time-invariant; allowing it to evolve adds
no additional insight. In section 2.2 we restrict K further, in line with
the related specialization of G. Until then, however, the discussion
requires no further assumptions on the pair (G,K).
Robert Lucas (1988) described how for economic growth knowl-
edge is necessarily at once global, not Chinese, or Korean, or US. This
model maintains that. But how eﬀective global knowledge A is at loca-
tion z depends both on one’s current state of knowledge and on one’s
neighbors’. Assume further that training or retooling costs need to be
expended before knowledge can be used in production. These training
costs at z are quadratic in A’s rate of change:
C(A˙t(z)) =
1
2
ζ × A˙t(z)2, ζ > 0. (3)
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While A’s eﬀectiveness in (1) is history- and geography-dependent,
from (3) the cost of changing it is neither, and is the same everywhere.
Transforming global knowledge to local use can also be interpreted as
changing general, codiﬁable knowledge to speciﬁc, tacit knowledge.
Coeﬃcient ζ parameterizes retooling costs: The larger is ζ, the
more sluggish will be changes in A. Assume that
4ζ−1 < ρ2, (4)
i.e., relative to how much the future is discounted, retooling costs gen-
erate suﬃciently high sluggishness.
Income, net of retooling costs, is then
yt(z) = F (As(z) | As)− C(A˙s(z)). (5)
Economy z at time t solves
sup
{As(z):s≥t}
∫
s≥t
ys(z)e−ρs ds (6)
s. t. conditions (1)–(5) and{
At(z)
{As(z′) : s ≥ t, z′ 
= z} .
An equilibrium is a collection of mutually consistent timepaths {As(z) :
s ≥ t}, one for each z, solving (6), or alternatively, a time path of pro-
ﬁles {As : s ≥ t} such that each z-section A(z) solves (6) and follows
what others expect of z. The equilibrium is rational expectations Nash
in the strategy space comprising timepaths {As(z) : s ≥ t} since expec-
tations are realized in equilibrium and (6) requires that each location
select a feasible timepath taking as given the choices made in all other
locations.
The model is one not only of a set of given locations choosing alter-
native patterns of development but, upon reinterpretation, also a model
of location choice, i.e., of a planner deciding where to place resources,
subject to feasibility constraints.
2 Results
At each z the program (6) has necessary ﬁrst-order condition the Euler
equation
Wz(At) + ζ
dA˙t(z)
dt
− ρζA˙t(z) = 0,
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which implies the decision rule
A˙t(z) = ζ−1 ×
∫ ∞
0
Wz(At+s)e−ρs ds (7)
where I have solved stable roots backwards and unstable roots forwards
(e.g., Thomas Sargent (1987, Ch. 9)).
2.1 Balanced Growth Steady State
Uniformity then is an equilibrium with A growing at proportional rate
g =
ρ
2
− (ρ
2 − 4ζ−1)1/2
2
∈ (0, ρ). (8)
If, as in Section 2.2 below, G is the surface of 3-dimensional globe,
then the balanced growth steady state equilibrium given in (8) can be
visualized easily: Across geography the level of knowledge is a globe
concentric with G, growing proportionally outwards. So too then the
spatial distribution of incomes. Nations everywhere have identical and
growing incomes. Convergence, equality, and globalization are total.
Balanced growth steady state (8) is a uniform equilibrium, however,
even without this restriction on G. To see this, note that at uniformity
with A growing at rate g < ρ, the right side of (7) becomes
ζ−1
∫ ∞
0
At+se
−ρs ds = ζ−1At
∫ ∞
0
e−(ρ−g)s ds
= [(ρ− g)ζ]−1At.
Location z therefore has
A˙t(z)/At = [(ρ− g)ζ]−1,
so that in uniform equilibrium with A˙t(z) = At, this becomes
g = [(ρ− g)ζ]−1.
This quadratic in g has one root given by (8); the other root exceeds
ρ/2, implying inﬁnite value to (6).
Notice that dg/dρ < 0 and dg/dζ < 0. The intuition is straightfor-
ward. The more myopic are decision makers, the lower is the steady-
state growth rate; similarly, the higher are retooling costs.
The analysis thus far has been blind to any special structure—for
instance, radial homogeneity—in G and K. Only in transition dynam-
ics will that matter. We turn now to this.
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ω′1 − ω1
K(eiω
′
, eiω)
0−π π
Fig. 1: Weighting kernel Spillovers across geography can be
asymmetric and unimodal. Section through K shown has ω′ = (ω′1, ω
′
2)
and ω = (ω1, ω2), with ω′2 and ω2 ﬁxed.
2.2 Transition Dynamics
Specialize G to the surface of a 3-dimensional globe. Using polar coordi-
nates the representative location is z = (z1, z2) = e−iω = (e−iω1 , e−iω2),
with i =
√−1 and ω ∈ [−π, π]× [−π, π].
Next, requireK be nondegenerate (i.e., K(z, ·) place positive weight
outside a small open neighborhood of z), continuously diﬀerentiable,
and radially homogeneous (i.e., K(eiω
′
, eiω) depend only on ω′ − ω).
Radial homogeneity diﬀers from symmetry, which would require instead
dependence on |ω′ − ω|.
Fig. 1 shows a section through a possible K. By radial homogeneity
K is graphed as a function of only ω′ − ω. Spillover weighting can
increase in that separation and be asymmetric about the origin. From
both these properties, it diﬀers from the usual decay due to physical
distance. A unimodal K is not ruled out, and indeed will suﬃce to
generate multiple modes in spatial outcomes below.
Outside of steady state, the transition behavior can be quite in-
tricate. To rule out extraordinary but nonetheless uninteresting out-
comes, assume equilibrium is Markov, i.e., at each location z there is
a time-invariant mapping Mz such that (7) becomes A˙t(z) = Mz(At).
The present discounted value on the right of (7) can be calculated as
depending only on the current knowledge proﬁle At. Detrending both
–6–
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sides around the equilibrium growth path A0egt and then stacking into
a spatial proﬁle gives
˙˜
At = M˜(A˜t), (9)
an ordinary diﬀerential equation in the space of bounded positive func-
tions on G.
To obtain intuition for what follows, recall Cass/Koopmans-type
dynamics when the transition equation (9) is ﬁnite and linear, with
steady state A˜t = A˜, i.e.,
˙˜
At = M˜ ×
(
A˜t − A˜
)
. (9′)
Suppose the ﬁnite matrix M˜ is diagonalizable
M˜ = ΦV Φ−1, V = diag{ν1, ν2, . . . }.
Stable or unstable dynamics hinge on the sign of the real parts of
eigenvalues νj by
(Φ−1 ˙˜At)j = νj ×
(
(Φ−1A˜t)j − (Φ−1A˜)j
)
. (10)
The convergent manifold is the collection of initial states A˜0 such that
(9′) takes the system to steady state A˜. Suppose V collects all νj with
negative real parts in its leading entries. From (10) the convergent
manifold has representation
q˜ : A˜0 − A˜ = Φ×
(
q˜
0
)
, (11)
zeroing out components that multiply into unstable eigenvalues.
In (9) for the current model, the convergent manifold—a subset
of the collection of spatial functions on G integrating to zero—is well
deﬁned. That manifold is the collection of initial states such that (9)
converges to zero. However, M˜ is an inﬁnite-dimensioned nonlinear
mapping. Any linearization into an equation such as (9′) will have the
eigenvector-eigenvalue decomposition evolving in time.
Recognize, however, that by its construction from a radially sym-
metric K the operator M˜ is Toeplitz (see, e.g., Turing (1952) and
Grenander and Szego¨ (1958))—if it were a matrix its rows would be
simply rotational shifts of one another. Alternatively, every ﬁxed diag-
onal section comprises only identical entries. Then M˜ has a spectrum
–7–
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A
Fig. 2: Spatial agglomeration on 3-dimensional globe Fig-
ure shows a horizontal slice through the local perturbations that con-
verge back to steady state only with clusters in the spatial distribution
(counterpart to the set of eigenvalues) that is discrete, and comprised
of Fourier transforms of horizontal sections of M˜ , while its eigenfunc-
tions (counterparts to eigenvectors) comprise only complex exponen-
tials e−iωj for integer j.
In parallel with (10) the spectrum determines the dynamics of de-
trended proﬁles A˜ about the steady-state growth path. In parallel with
(11) the eigenfunctions determine the convergent manifold: Here, every
element of the convergent manifold is a linear combination of complex
exponentials, i.e., 2-dimensional waves on G. Moreover, when retooling
costs ζ are neither too large nor too small, the nullifying of spectral el-
ements required in (11) makes the convergent manifold a strict subset
of the full span of the eigenfunctions.3 Multiple modes then neces-
sarily appear in the spatial distributions that comprise the convergent
manifold—see Fig. 2.
Along the equilibrium path, where the spatial agglomerations locate
relative to one another in G—the bumps in Fig. 2—will be determined
by the ω’s that remain active in (11). Those ω’s are, in turn, func-
tions of all the parameters of the model (K, ζ, ρ). Economic activity
3 Quah (2000, 2001) provides explicit technical details in this rea-
soning.
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across space has a proﬁle that depends on both those active ω’s and
the corresponding spectra. The dynamics of the spatial distribution of
economic activity can, in turn, be read oﬀ (10).
3 Conclusions
When spatial inequality is studied in a model with discrete locations
ﬁxed, many interesting questions cannot be addressed. This paper
develops a model of economic growth and activity that permits a richer
analysis needed for that discussion.
The spatial neoclassical growth model in this paper has knowledge
accumulation as the engine of growth. Equilibrium in the model is ra-
tional expectations and Nash. Knowledge spillovers across geography
and optimal knowledge accumulation decisions determine in equilib-
rium the distribution of knowledge used across space and over time.
The resulting pattern of economic activity is not concentrated on dis-
crete isolated points but is instead a dynamically-ﬂuctuating, smooth
spatial distribution. Spatial inequality is a Cass-Koopmans saddlepath
in the space of spatial distributions, and the global distribution of eco-
nomic activity converges towards egalitarian growth. Equality is stable
but spatial inequality is needed to attain it.
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